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1 
THE “LONG ARM” OF THE LAW: OBTAINING PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER A PARENT COMPANY IN COLORADO 
Under a new personal jurisdiction test in Colorado for out-of-state 
parent companies, plaintiffs now face a heavy factual burden and in some 
situations might be priced out of bringing a suit. In Griffith v. SSC Pueb-
lo Belmont Operation Co.1 and Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial 
Columns Operating Co.,2 the Colorado Supreme Court promulgated a 
test to apply when determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction 
over a parent company that does not have minimum contacts within the 
state.3 The Supreme Court held that a court may obtain personal jurisdic-
tion through imputing a subsidiary company’s jurisdiction onto the par-
ent company.4 To impute personal jurisdiction, a court must find suffi-
cient justification to pierce the subsidiary company’s corporate veil.5 
Otherwise, a court must evaluate the personal jurisdiction of each entity 
separately.6 The Supreme Court imposes a heavy factual burden on the 
plaintiff, which incentivizes parent companies to form many layers of 
limited liability entities not distinct from itself. To prove this conclusion, 
this article will first examine the Supreme Court’s holding in Griffith and 
Meeks and then argue that the holdings in both cases force a plaintiff to 
satisfy a heavy factual burden and incur additional costs, which in turn 
incentivizes parent companies to form multiple entities without making 
each distinct from the parent company. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Under Colorado Law, a court may have personal jurisdiction over 
an individual in any cause of action arising from a business transaction, 
tort, real property dispute,7 or the maintenance of matrimonial domicile.8 
“In enacting [the] long-arm statute, the Colorado legislature intended to 
extend the jurisdiction of [the] courts to the fullest extent permitted by 
the due process clause of the United States Constitution.”9 This “long-
arm statute” enables Colorado Courts to obtain jurisdiction over entities 
  
 1. 2016 CO 60M, as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 17, 2016). 
 2. 2016 CO 61 (Sept. 26, 2016). 
 3. Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operation Co., 2016 CO 60M, ¶ 1, as modified on denial 
of reh’g (Oct. 17, 2016); Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co., 2016 
CO 61, ¶ 6 (Colo. Sept. 26, 2016). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. The real property must be situated in the State of Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 
(stating that a court may have personal jurisdiction on “any cause of action arising from[] [t]he 
ownership, use or possession of any real property situated in [Colorado].”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pnematiques Michelin v. Dist. Court In & for Jefferson 
Cty, 620 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Colo. 1980). 
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as well as individuals so long as the nonresident defendant has minimum 
contacts.10 Some examples of such minimum contacts are “having agen-
cy relationships within the forum state or placing products into the 
stream of commerce.”11 Both Griffith and Meeks address the problem of 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over a parent company where the parent 
company does not have minimum contacts.12 
A. Griffith 
In Griffith, the personal representative of the Estate of Antonio 
Jimenez, Jr. filed a complaint against eleven parties comprised of nine 
entities and two individuals.13 The suit alleges that one of the entities, 
SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Company, was negligent and that the 
entity’s negligence caused the wrongful death of Mr. Jimenez.14 The 
other entities included in the suit are layers in “a complex organizational 
structure” where one entity would be a wholly owned subsidiary of an-
other entity which is also a wholly owned subsidiary of a different enti-
ty.15 The problem in Griffith is that not all the entities are residents of 
Colorado or have minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction.16 
To obtain personal jurisdiction, the trial court applied a distinct entity 
test.17 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined 
that all nine entities were not distinct from each other and therefore the 
subsidiary company’s (SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Company) juris-
diction could be imputed onto the remaining entities.18 
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s distinct entity 
test.19 Instead, it held that a trial court must find sufficient justification to 
pierce the corporate veil to impute personal jurisdiction.20 If the corpo-
rate veil cannot be pierced, then a trial court must determine personal 
jurisdiction separately for each entity.21 The Court examined three ways 
in which to pierce the corporate veil: “when (1) the entity is ‘merely the 
alter ego’ of the member, (2) the LLC form is used to perpetuate a 
wrong, and (3) disregarding the legal entity would achieve an equitable 
result.”22 To establish that an entity is an alter ego, the Supreme Court 
  
 10. Griffith, ¶ 20 (citing Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 14, 25 (Colo. Sept. 12, 
2016) reh'g denied (Oct. 3, 2016)). 
 11. Magill, ¶ 25.  
 12. Griffith, ¶ 2; Meeks, ¶ 2. 
 13. Griffith, ¶ 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 16. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 17. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at ¶ 15–16. 
 20. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 21. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 22. Id. at ¶ 12 (citing In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006)). 
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introduced a list of factors that a trial court should consider before com-
ing to its determination.23 The factors to consider are:  
(1) The parent owns all the stock; (2) both have common directors 
and officers; (3) the parent finances the subsidiary; (4) the parent 
causes the subsidiary's incorporation; (5) the subsidiary has grossly 
inadequate capital; (6) the parent pays salaries or expenses of the 
subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary has no business except with its parent 
or subsidiary corporation or no assets except those transferred by its 
parent or subsidiary; (8) directors and officers do not act inde-
pendently in the interests of the subsidiary; (9) formal legal require-
ments of the subsidiary such as keeping corporate minutes are not 
observed; (10) distinctions between the parent and subsidiary . . . are 
disregarded or confused; (11) subsidiaries do not have full board[s] 
of directors.24 
The Supreme Court concluded its opinion by remanding the case 
back to the trial court to determine whether personal jurisdiction over the 
non-resident entities is warranted under the new test.25 
B. Meeks 
Meeks also concerns whether a trial court can impute personal juris-
diction over a non-resident parent company.26 Like Griffith, there was a 
“complex organizational structure,” and the trial court did not have juris-
diction over all of the entities.27 The trial court in Meeks also applied a 
distinct entity test when determining personal jurisdiction.28 Like Grif-
fith, the trial court found that the entities were not distinct and imputed 
personal jurisdiction onto the other companies.29 The trial court in Meeks 
did not conduct an evidentiary hearing before coming to its conclusion.30 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s choice not to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing and by applying the distinct entity test.31 
II. ARGUMENT 
The Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in Griffith and Meeks failed 
to recognize that the distinct entity test has the same goal as the alter ego 
  
 23. Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (10th Cir. 
1980) (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (applying Colorado law))). 
 24. Id. (quoting Luckett, 618 F.2d at 1378 n.4 (citing Fish, 114 F.2d at 191 (applying Colora-
do law))). 
 25. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 26. Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co., 2016 CO 61, ¶ 1 
(Colo. Sept. 26, 2016). 
 27. See id. at ¶ 2 (“The facts of this case are similar to those in Griffith.”); see also Griffith, ¶ 
2–3. 
 28. Meeks, ¶ 3. 
 29. Id.; Griffith, ¶ 6.  
 30. Meeks, ¶ 3. 
 31. Id. at ¶ 8, 13. 
4 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
test and failed to recognize the additional costs and incentives associated 
with requiring a more fact-intensive alter ego test.32 
A. Distinct Entity v. Alter Ego 
The Supreme Court believes that the distinct entity test is different 
from an alter ego test.33 However, both tests have the same goal of im-
puting jurisdiction if the entities are not separate from each other.34 The 
alter ego analysis and the distinct entity test both are applied to conclude 
that companies are one in the same.35 The difference between the two is 
that the alter ego test requires a court to examine multiple factors before 
imputing personal jurisdiction.36 The trial court in Griffith reasoned “that 
the entities all ‘operated the Colorado nursing home as one business in 
which they collectively controlled the operations, planning, management, 
and budget of [Belmont Lodge] in Colorado.’”37 While not explicitly 
relying on the factors included in the alter ego test, it is reasonable to 
assume that the trial court came to its decision by taking into account 
some, if not all, of the factors that are in the alter ego test.38 While the 
Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s use of the distinct entity 
test, the trial court followed the same underlying reasoning as the alter 
ego test.36  
In Meeks, the Supreme Court disapproved that the trial court did not 
conduct an evidentiary hearing before imputing personal jurisdiction on 
the nonresident entities.39 Both Griffith and Meeks show that the Su-
preme Court wants trial courts to conduct extensive fact-finding when 
determining whether to impute personal jurisdiction.40 These rulings in-
dicate that the reasoning behind the distinct entity test is valid, but that 
the party alleging personal jurisdiction has a burden of providing an ex-
tensive factual record which satisfies the list of factors in the alter ego 
test.  
B. Ramifications 
While it is likely that a trial court already considers some, if not all, 
of the factors laid out in Griffith, now a trial court must explicitly refer-
  
 32. See Id. at ¶ 7; see Griffith, ¶ 21. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Griffith, ¶ 4–6, 13. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.4 (10th Cir. 
1980) (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940) (applying Colorado law))). 
 37. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 38. See Id. at ¶ 6, 13 (quoting Luckett, 618 F.2d at 1378 n.4 (citing Fish, 114 F.2d at 191 
(applying Colorado law))). 
 36. Id. at ¶ 6. 
 39. Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co., 2016 CO 61, ¶ 10–11 
(Colo. Sept. 26, 2016). 
 40. Id.; see Griffith, ¶ 13 (requiring a court to examine eleven factors before determining that 
a subsidiary company is acting as an alter ego). 
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ence each of the eleven factors the Supreme Court provides. This list of 
factors creates a high factual bar for a trial court to leap over before de-
termining personal jurisdiction. The problem with having such a strin-
gent factual requirement is that the process will take time to establish if a 
subsidiary is really an alter ego of a parent company because of the com-
bative nature of the discovery process.41 This time frame drastically in-
creases when a plaintiff wishes to bring in many different entities like the 
scenario in Griffith and Meeks. This burden means that plaintiffs will 
incur more costs when trying to bring in other nonresident parent com-
panies. 
While one must respect the Supreme Court’s ruling as protecting 
the purpose of having a limited liability entity, that being to limit the 
liability of the entity’s members, one must also consider whether a dis-
tinction should be made when an LLC has multiple layers of ownership 
like in Griffith and Meeks. While this rule makes perfect sense when an 
LLC has only one layer of ownership, it creates too heavy of a burden for 
a plaintiff when an LLC has multiple layers of ownership. This burden 
on the plaintiffs also creates an incentive for parent companies to create 
many layers of ownership. Hypothetically, a company can limit its liabil-
ity and operate its subsidiaries like an “alter ego” without worrying about 
the repercussions because of the increased costs associated with attempt-
ing to pierce the corporate veil using an alter ego theory. Large compa-
nies with multiple layers of limited liability entities operating as alter 
egos will have less risk of being dragged to court because of the time and 
costs associated with trying to prove an alter ego theory. So while the 
Supreme Court’s ruling is reasonable when looking at a layer of limited 
liability that does not extend past one level of ownership, the test is un-
reasonable when applying the Supreme Court’s test to a subsidiary with a 
“complex organizational structure.” 
III. CONCLUSION 
While both the rulings in Griffith and Meeks attempt to balance the 
interests of both limited liability members and plaintiffs, the Colorado 
Supreme Court created a test to impute jurisdiction on parent companies 
that creates a substantial factual burden which in turn incentivizes parent 




 41. See Richard P. Holme, Colorado's New Rules of Civil Procedure, Part I: Case Manage-
ment and Disclosure, 23 COLO. LAW. 2467, 2468–69 (1994) (discussing the change of the rule 
governing case management and trial management to combat discovery abuse). 
 * Juris Doctor candidate 2018, University of Denver Sturm College of Law and Staff Editor 
for the Denver Law Review. 
